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PHYSICIAN'S NEGLIGENCE GIVING RISE TO THE BIRTH OF A
HEALTHY BUT UNPLANNED CHILD: A SUMMARY OF
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY THE PARENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The decision to undergo a sterilization operation1 or an abortion 2 is the
result of considering many complex emotional and financial factors. The
operation may be sought to avoid potential health risks associated with
childbirth, 3 or it may be sought to avoid the financial stress a new child
will place on the family unit.4 Regardless of the rationale underlying the
decision, the individual will require medical assistance. In some situa-
tions, however, this medical assistance is negligently performed, and the
result may be the birth of a healthy but unplanned child.6
1. There are three basic types of sterilization operations: 1) tubal ligation (female): the
cutting and tying of the tubes leading from the ovaries to the uterus; 2) hysterectomy (fe-
male): the removal of the uterus; and 3) vasectomy (male): the interruption of the vas defer-
ens which is the tube carrying spermatozoa from the testicle. See 5A LAWYER'S MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA § 36.43 (A. Smith rev. vol. 1972).
2. The three major medical methods of performing an abortion are as follows: 1) cervical
dilation and curettage (scraping) of the uterus; 2) vacuum aspiration-best used in early
stages of pregnancy; and 3) a method involving withdrawal of the amniotic fluid surrounding
the fetus and replacing it with a physiological salt solution. Id. § 36.42b.
3. See, e.g., Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (sterilization
operation).
4. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (sterilization
operation).
5. Many similar situations have arisen in this area and include alleged negligence by a
physician in not warning prospective parents of possible birth defects in the child. See
Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (misdiagnosis of rubella in pregnant
woman and failure to warn of possible birth defects); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp.
544 (S.C. 1981) (failure to perform amniocentesis test although the need for such test was
indicated; resulting birth of child with Down's Syndrome gave rise to parents' cause of ac-
tion); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (S.C. 1980) (child's cause of action denied);
Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (failure to warn
of possible Tay Sachs hereditary disease); Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D.
Ohio 1975) (failure to diagnose and treat rubella in mother does not give the deformed child
a cause of action); Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)
(possible hereditary birth defects); Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165
Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (negligent performance of laboratory tests resulting in failure to warn
of possible Tay Sachs disease); DiNatale v. Lieberman, 409 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (failure to warn of possible birth defects); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (rubella related birth defects); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 351,
308 N.W.2d 209 (1981) (failure to diagnose rubella and warn of birth defects); Schroeder v.
Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (failure to diagnose cystic fibrosis in the first child
and to warn of the possibility of the disease recurring in second child); Berman v. Allen, 80
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (failure to advise parents of availability of amniocentesis test;
child born with Down's Syndrome); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)
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Such negligence has given rise to a cause of action6 on the part of the
parents 7 and is generally a result of either the negligent performance of a
sterilization or abortion operation,8 or a negligent assurance by the physi-
(rubella related birth defects); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (failure to advise of availability of amniocentesis test; child born with
Down's Syndrome), modifying Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (first
child born with fatal heredity disease; failure to warn of possible recurrence created causes
of action for both parents and child); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933
(1977) (failure to advise parents of the risks of pregnancy and the likelihood of giving birth
to a deformed child and failure to inform of availability of amniocentesis); Howard v.
Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976) (failure to warn of possible Tay Sachs he-
reditary disease); aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Johnsons v.
Yeshiva University, 53 A.D.2d 523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1976) (failure to perform amniocente-
sis when consulted for genetic counseling), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41
(1968) (failure to warn of rubella connected birth defects), modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (failure to inform preg-
nant woman that she had rubella); Naccash v. Burger, - Va. -, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982)
(negligent performance of Tay Sachs test on parents; child born with disease); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (rubella not diagnosed and/or phy-
sician failed to warn of possible birth defects).
A related situation exists where a physician negligently fails to ascertain that the patient
is pregnant or negligently performs a sterilization operation and a healthy child is born. See
Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981); Debora S. v. Sapega,
56 A.D.2d 841, 392 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1977); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1974); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974); Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
6. There has been considerable confusion in the use of the terms "wrongful life," "wrong-
ful birth," "wrongful conception," and "wrongful pregnancy." Many commentators have at-
tempted to sort out the different factual situations and apply the correct terms to them. See
supra note 5 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays for
Bringing Up Baby?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 418 (1978) (suggesting that "wrongful conception"
is where the parents do not want a child as opposed to "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life"
actions where the parents want a healthy child) [hereinafter cited as Note, Wrongful Con-
ception: Who Pays]; Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judi-
cial Fiat, 13 VAL. U.L. REv. 127 (1978) ("Wrongful birth" is where the wrong begins at
conception as compared to "wrongful life" where the wrong begins with the unsuccessful
"killing" of the child.) [hereinafter cited as Note, Mandate and Mishandling]. There seems
to be no general consensus by the courts as to the use of the terms. Compare Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (using the term "wrongful conception" in a
negligent sterilization case) with Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (using the
term "wrongful life" in a similar situation).
This article deals primarily with cases concerning the birth of a healthy child whose birth
the parents had not planned and avoids labelling these cases with a specific term. If one is
required, however, then the action is for the birth of a "healthy but unplanned child."
7. For a case in which an action against the physician was brought on behalf of the new-
born child's brothers and sisters, alleging that their share of love, affection, and the family
exechequer was reduced from one-third to one-fourth, see Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (cause of action dismissed).
8. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (sterilization); Stills v. Gratton,
55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (abortion).
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cian that the operation was a success.9 The latter situation is usually, but
not always, accompanied by post-operative tests which erroneously indi-
cate the success of the operation. 10
If negligence on the part of a physician can be shown, most courts will
allow a cause of action under general negligence principles."' The courts,
however, are split on the issue of assessment of damages. 2 The problem
arises when courts consider the child's rearing expenses as an element of
damages.
Recently, this issue was addressed in two cases arising in Virginia. The
first, McNeal v. United States,15 is a United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, case applying Virginia law to the issue of recovery of child
rearing expenses as a result of an alleged negligently performed steriliza-
tion operation. The second case, Johnson v. Miller,"" is a state circuit
court case where the trial judge considered the same damage issue as a
result of an alleged negligently performed abortion. The McNeal court
affirmed the trial court's determination that negligence had not been
proven and noted that Virginia would not allow such recovery because it
was against the state's public policy.15 The Johnson court held the oppo-
9. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974).
Many of these cases are brought on alternative theories. See, e.g., Mason v. Western Pa.
Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981) (plaintiff alleged first, that physician
breached express and implied warranties that sterilization would prevent childbirth, and
second, that he was negligent in performing the tubal ligation). While this article is based
mainly on a cause of action in negligence, it is important to note that litigants may run into
problems with an action based on contract or warranty theories because the courts have
generally held that there must be a separate contract or guaranty, supported by considera-
tion, in order for a cause of action to lie. Id. at 1368. But cf. Note, Wrongful Conception:
Who Pays, supra note 6, at 426 (suggesting that some litigants may wish to take advantage
of a longer statute of limitations for contract actions as compared to tort actions). See gen-
erally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 92 (4th ed. 1971) (stating that contract damages may be
limited in various ways whereas tort damages are limited by only proximate causation and
policy considerations denying recovery to certain types of interests).
10. Compare Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) (no post-operative
tests; assurance given) with Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974) (post-
operative tests done; assurance given).
11. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977) ("[S]uch an
action is indistinguishable from an ordinary medical negligence action ... ."); Bowman v.
Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, -, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) ("[This case] is a traditional negli-
gence action."). But see LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (No cause of
action for the birth of a healthy child exists in Texas.).
12. Compare Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982) (allowing only pregnancy
and childbirth related damages) with Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967) (allowing all damages proximately caused by negligence, including child rearing
expenses).
13. No. 82-1014, slip op. (4th Cir. Sept. 27, 1982).
14. No. L-80-2378 (Cir. Ct. of the City of Norfolk 1982).
15. McNeal, slip op. at 5-6. There was a concurrence in this case by Judge Ervin, who
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site, and allowed the jury to consider all of the alleged damages, including
those attributed to child rearing expenses.16 This case is presently on
appeal.
17
This article' s begins with a summary of the damages that are generally
recoverable in a case involving the birth of a healthy but unplanned child,
and then critically examines the various methods courts use to deny or
allow all or some of the child rearing expenses. This article concludes
with a prediction of the disposition of Johnson v. Miller on appeal to the
Virginia Supreme Court and a suggested method for consistency in the
awarding of damages for the birth of a healthy but unplanned child.
II. DAMAGES RECOVERABLE GENERALLY
The types of damages which commonly are awarded in cases involving
the birth of a healthy but unplanned child are those closely associated
with the pregnancy and childbirth. In Sherlock v. StilIwater Clinic,1 9 a
case involving a negligently performed sterilization, the court held that
the parents should, at a minimum, recover these damages because the
award is wholly consistent with the elementary principle of compensatory
damages that places the plaintiff in the position he would have been in
had no wrong occurred.2 0 These damages include the pain and suffering of
the pregnancy and childbirth, loss of wages of the mother during preg-
nancy and childbirth, and medical costs associated with the pregnancy,
childbirth and immediate medical care thereafter.21 Some courts have al-
lowed damages for the mental anguish suffered by the parent during
pregnancy and childbirth,22 and others have awarded damages for a cura-
tive sterilization operation.2 Further, the father may recover for the loss
of comfort, companionship, consortium, and services of his wife during
agreed with the holding as to the negligence issue, but refused to speculate how Virginia
would decide a "wrongful birth" cause of action. Id. at 7.
16. No. L-80-2378 (Jury Instruction No. 5).
17. No. L-80-2378.
18. For the purposes of this article, negligence will be presumed to have been proven. For
a discussion of the elements of proof of negligence in these types of actions, see generally
Comment, Pregnancy After Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J. FAM.
L. 635 (1972-73).
19. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
20. Id. at 175.
21. See, e.g., Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); P. v. Portadin,
179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.C. 1981); Boone v. Mullendore, 416
So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982). But see Sala v. Tomlinson, 448 N.Y.S.2d 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(no recovery for emotional distress occasioned by an unsuccessful tubal ligation); but cf.
Stribling v. deQuevedo, 422 A.2d 505 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (allowing emotional distress re-
covery incidental to the negligent surgery, but not incidental to childbirth).
23. See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, - N.H. -, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982).
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pregnancy up to and immediately after the birth of the child.2 4
These damages are awarded because they proximately are caused by
the physician's negligence and because most courts consider these dam-
ages to be a fair approximation of the injury sustained.25 It has been
noted that to disallow such costs would, in the absence of an award for
child rearing expenses, permit tortious conduct by a physician to be to-
tally uncompensable.26 Public policy cannot countenance such a result.
2
III. CHILD REARING EXPENSES
A. Introduction
There is a definitive split among the courts concerning the recover-
ability of child rearing costs associated with a healthy but unplanned
child. 8 Some courts allow recovery of all expenses incidental to the rear-
ing of the child.2 9 Others allow such expenses, but permit the defendant
to prove offsetting benefits conferred upon the parents as a result of the
birth and rearing of a healthy child.80 Finally, some courts disallow all
expenses attributable to the rearing of the child."1
A few courts which hold with the latter position have based their deci-
sions on general public policy grounds that a parent is not injured by the
birth of a healthy child. Thus, in Wilczynski v. Goodman, 2 in considering
the issue of damages in relation to a negligently performed abortion, the
24. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Boone v. Mullendore, 416
So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982).
25. Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, _, 428 A.2d 1366, 1381 (1981)
(Hester, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[Tihe rule ... is ... consonant with the very real
expenses attendant to the injury suffered and the obvious difficulties stemming from the
unexpected pregnancy of the woman.")
26. See Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 IMI. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979) (negligent abor-
tion case).
27. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, _- 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971) (misfilled
prescription for birth control pills by pharmacist); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena, J., dissenting).
28. For a judicial discussion of the split, see Kingsbury v. Smith, - N.H. 442 A.2d
1003 (1982).
There is also a split among the courts concerning the recovery of child rearing expenses
when a physician has failed to warn prospective parents of possible birth defects. Compare
Naccash v. Burger, - Va. -, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982) (allowing all damages proximately
caused by the negligence including care and treatment of the child suffering from Tay Sachs
disease) with Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (limiting recovery
to the costs of caring for the child born with birth defects as a result of the mother's rubella,
less the costs of raising a normal child).
29. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 IMI. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981); Bowman v.
Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
30. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976).
31. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982).
32. 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979).
19831
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court stated:
In our judgment, a public policy which deems precious even potential life
while yet in the womb, at such a cost and expense that condition may en-
tail, does not countenance as compensable damage to its parent or parents
those additional costs and expenses necessary to sustain and nurture that
life once it comes to fruition upon and after successful birth. The existence
of a normal, healthy life is an esteemed right under our laws, rather than a
compensable wrong. 3
This view, however, was rejected in Custodio v. Bauer,4 the first case
to award child rearing expenses for a healthy but unplanned child. In
that case, involving a negligently performed sterilization, the court noted
that "the compensation is not for the so-called unwanted child. . . but to
replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival will not deprive
the other members of the family of what was planned as their just share
of the family income."' 5 Thus, the court noted, this is not a case where
the damages suffered, or the injury alleged, derives from the child's right
to life. Rather, the injury alleged is to the parents as it affects their
rights.36
The better reasoned view seems to suggest that the focus in these cases
should not be on the worth and sanctity of life, but on (1) the physician's
negligence in the performance of the sterilization or abortion;" and (2)
33. Id. at -, 391 N.E.2d at 487; see also Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084,
1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("In our view, however, its basic soundness lies in the simple
proposition that a parent cannot be said to have been damaged by the birth and rearing of a
normal, healthy child.")
It is important to note that these courts awarded damages for pregnancy related expenses.
As one judge has suggested, however, there seems to be a contradiction in holding that the
rearing of a child does not present any compensable wrong, but the birth and pregnancy,
which are necessary to that child's existence, do represent compensable wrongs. See Terrell
v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 130-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena, J., dissenting).
34. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
35. Id. at , 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477; see also Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1976) (negligent abortion case).
36. In Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978) (negligently performed
sterilization; birth of a healthy child), the court noted that other courts may have problems
considering the birth of a child as a compensable wrong. The court suggested:
[W]rongful life... is an unfortunate epithet, primarily because it is inaccurate as a
description either of the wrong which has been committed or of the injury suffered.
By analogy, the term "wrongful death" suffers from the same ambiguity, since the
law does not give compensation for the death itself, but rather for the pecuniary loss
which results from it. On the other hand, wrongful life does seem to crystallize the
fundamental idea underlying much of the opposition to such law suits-that idea
being that birth or life, whether wanted or unwanted, perfect or deformed, is an ulti-
mate good which can in no sense be regarded as a wrong.
Id. at -, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
37. See Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979) (unsuccessful vasec-
tomy operation), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
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whether this negligence should give rise to damages as it affects the fam-
ily's rights.
B. Specific Public Policy Arguments
Aside from the general public policy argument based on the theory that
a healthy child is not an injury to his parents, many courts use specific
public policy arguments to deny recovery of child rearing expenses. Thus
the state's concern with the harmony of the family unit,38 or the concern
over the unreasonable burden such an award would place on the physi-
cian,39 serve to deny parents recovery of these expenses.
Moreover, some courts base their decisions on a public disdain for al-
lowing parents to receive all of the benefits of raising the child while plac-
ing the economic costs of these benefits on the physicians. 40 There has
been the suggestion that such an award would lead to an increase of
fraudulent claims. 41 Finally, some courts do not want their trials to de-
generate to the point that parents will have to plead before juries that
their child is an injury to them. 2
Many recent decisions, however, have countered these arguments. As to
the fears of the courts that the defendant will be forced to sustain an
unreasonable burden, or that fraudulent claims will be advanced, one
court has suggested that "these reasons ignore the judicial processes
which daily meet other problems of equal difficulty and complexity with
commendable results.' 4 It also seems that the courts which deny recov-
ery on the grounds that the parents are receiving all the benefits while
the defendant must pay all the costs ignore the fact that an opposite
holding may place upon the parents "such catastrophic financial conse-
quences" that the benefits may not justly compensate the parents for this
injury.44 Further, in the case of a family which cannot financially support
another child (i.e., the case of a poor family with a large number of chil-
dren), any easing of the economic burden in respect to the raising of the
new child may promote family harmony rather than disrupt it, at least as
38. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568
(Ark. 1982).
39. See, e.g., P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); see also Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
40. See, e.g., Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); J.P.M. & B.M. v.
Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d 515 (1981) (involving a suit against
manufacturer of condoms alleging negligent construction of condoms resulted in birth of
child); see also Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8
(1975).
41. See, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wisc. 2d at _, 219 N.W.2d at 245.
42. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Public Health Trust v. Brown,
388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
43. Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, , 408 A.2d 496, 504 (1979).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 68-75.
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it is aimed at the new child.45
It must be remembered that the parents are the innocent parties; it was
the physician's negligence which is the cause of the economic burden on
the parents. Thus, it has been suggested, the courts which deny child
rearing expenses on public policy grounds are overlooking an equally
strong public policy argument which forbids tortious actions and the con-
sequences flowing from such actions to go uncompensated. "[I]t is axio-
matic that the tort-feasor is liable for all damages which ordinarily and in
the natural course of things have resulted from the commission of the
tort. ' 46
There has been, however, another public policy argument advanced by
some courts to deny child rearing expenses. This argument is that there is
"the possible harm that can be caused to the unwanted child who will one
day learn that he not only was not wanted by his or her parents, but was
reared by funds supplied by another person. Some authors have referred
to such a child as an 'emotional bastard'. . .. 47
Some courts have sought to alleviate this problem by allowing parties
to use anonymous names in the headings of cases.48 If the fear is that
friends or relatives of the child will tell him or her of the financial ar-
rangements responsible for his upbringing (presumably at an advanced
age of understanding), "[tihe emotional injury to the child can be no
greater than that to be found in many families where 'planned
parenthood' has not followed the blueprint.' 49 Finally, it seems that any
emotional damage, these courts fear, may occur due to the fact that the
family has filed a lawsuit or has recovered general damages because of his
birth. It is submitted that any damage awarded for child rearing expenses
will not serve to heighten this emotional damage.
Many courts in recent years have ignored these public policy arguments
on the grounds that family planning has achieved a constitutionally pro-
tected status.50 These courts cite the Supreme Court's decisions of Gris-
45. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (Pearson, J., dissenting) ("I see nothing humane in denying a parent the wherewithal
which might save a child from deprivation or, in many cases, abject poverty.").
46. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d at 508; see also Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511 (1971).
47. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982).
48. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); P. v.
Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); see also J.P.M. & B.M. v. Schmid Labo-
ratories, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d 515 (1981) (negligent manufacturing of con-
doms); Debora S. v. Sapega, 56 A.D.2d 841, 392 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1977) (physician's failure to
diagnose pregnancy).
49. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, -, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967).
50. See, e.g., Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Rivera v. State, 94




wold v. Connecticut,51 and Roe v. Wade52 and its progeny,53 for the prop-
osition that there is a fundamental right to limit the size of one's family,
or, to put it another way, a fundamental right to not-procreate. Thus,
these courts say that "public policy cannot support an exception to tort
liability when the impact of such an exception would impair the exercise
of a constitutionally protected right ' " or "for this court to endorse a pol-
icy that makes physicians liable for the foreseeable consequences of all
negligently performed operations except those involving sterilization
would constitute an impermissible infringement of a fundamental
right.
55
Some commentators, however, have suggested that the later Supreme
Court decisions of Maher v. Roe 5 and Poelker v. Doe5" stand for the
proposition that a state may encourage childbirth, as opposed to contra-
ception and abortion, and that a court's denial of child rearing expenses
could thus be rationalized.5 8 If a state denies child rearing recovery, this
could be an encouragement of an adoption-alternative by the parents,
and thus provide a sound policy reason to deny recovery.59
Assuming arguendo that the denial of child rearing expenses encour-
ages adoption, and that this, as one court questioned, should be the sound
policy of a state,60 it must be conceded that this argument merely in-
terjects another public policy consideration into an issue already over-
whelmed by policy considerations. As one judge recently suggested, if
there are many conflicting policy considerations, and it is unclear what
the public policy of the state is, it is quite obvious that there is no strong
public policy which denies recovery of child rearing expenses.61 Thus, it
appears that courts should not rule as a matter of law that public policy
considerations must always outweigh the economic burden of the parent.
Members of a jury should be allowed to consider all arguments and, based
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives by a married person); see also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (use of contraceptives by unmarried persons).
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to have abortion).
53. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (abortion).
54. Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. at , 445 A.2d at 885.
55. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, -- , 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) (per curiam). An
in depth examination of the constitutional arguments is beyond the scope of this article.
The arguments presented in the text are the arguments advanced by the courts and com-
mentators who have considered these constitutional issues in the area of healthy but un-
planned children.
56. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
57. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Note, Mandate and Mishandling, supra note 6, at 144.
59. Id.
60. In Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 259, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971), the court
stated: "The law has long recognized the desirability of permitting a child to be reared by
his natural parents."
61. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Ark. 1982) (Dudley, J., dissenting).
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on their own experiences, weigh both public policy and economic factors
when ruling on the issue of damages.
C. Benefits Conferred: A Denial of Expenses as a Matter of Law
Since 1934 and Christensen v. Thornby,6 2 the first case dealing with the
issue of damages in an unsuccessful sterilization case, many courts have
denied child rearing expenses on the ground that the benefits a parent
receives from the birth and rearing of a healthy child outweigh any eco-
nomic burden associated with that rearing."3 A few courts rationalize such
a benefits-conferred approach by stressing the public interest of the
state,6 4 thus characterizing this argument as a basic public policy argu-
ment.6 5 Other courts state the proposition as a rule of law and give it the
weight of an irrebuttable presumption.6 However expressed, the basic ar-
gument is that "it is a matter of universally-shared emotion and senti-
ment that the intangible but all important, incalculable but invaluable
'benefits' of parenthood far outweigh any of the mere monetary burdens
involved. 61
7
One court, in considering an analogous situation involving the misfilling
of a prescription for birth control pills, countered the benefits-conferred
argument by stating:
Contraceptives are used to prevent the birth of healthy children. To say
that for reasons of public policy contraceptive failure can result in no dam-
age as a matter of law ignores the fact that tens of millions of persons use
contraceptives daily to avoid the very result which the defendant would
have us say is always a benefit, never a detriment. Those tens of millions of
persons, by their conduct, express the sense of the community."
62. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). Although this case ruled that plaintiff had failed
to sustain his burden of proof as to his misrepresentation and warranty claims, Christensen
has been cited by courts for the proposition that the benefits-conferred outweigh the bur-
dens-suffered. Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, -, 408 A.2d 496, 504-05 (1979), modi-
fied, 439 A.2d 110 (1981). Since the decision in Christensen the Minnesota Supreme Court
has reexamined the issue of damages and has reinterpreted that part of Christensen as mere
dicta. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (holding that child rearing
expenses, as offset by benefits-conferred, are recoverable).
63. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349
A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
64. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d at 128.
65. See supra text accompanying note 61 (possible problems with public policy
arguments).
66. See Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d at 1086. See also Boone v. Mullendore,
416 So. 2d at 722.
67. Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d at 1085-86. For a case holding that these
"mere economic burdens" may be "catastrophic," see Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157,
404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (1978).
68. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, -, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971).
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One commentator has suggested that this argument overlooks the fact
that millions of other people have children, or adopt children and believe,
therefore, that the benefits outweigh the burdens. This argument, how-
ever, is not advanced for the proposition that all persons view the bur-
dens as outweighing the benefits conferred. It merely stands to contradict
the reasoning that state sentiment necessarily holds the opposite view.7°
Moreover, the fact that a "normal" person does not view the rearing of
a healthy child as an injury, or alternatively, the fact that "normal" par-
ents are benefitted more than burdened by the rearing of the child,
should not preclude recovery by the parent who feels he has been bur-
dened, and who has in fact been burdened.71
It is arguable that the birth of a healthy child confers so substantial a bene-
fit as to outweigh the expenses of birth and support. In the great majority of
cases, this is no doubt true... but can we say, as a matter of law, that a
healthy child always confers such an overriding benefit?7 2
This argument is consistent with the more general negligence principle
that a tort-feasor must take the injured party as he finds him.73
The parent who seeks a sterlization or abortion already has decided
that the burdens to him or her outweigh the benefits of rearing a child
and negligent interference with that decision should be found compensa-
ble. The physician should not be heard to complain that other parents
would consider the benefits as outweighing the burdens. As one judge
stated: "The doctor whose negligence brings about such an undesired
birth should not be allowed to say 'I did you a favor,' secure in the knowl-
edge that the courts will give this claim the effect of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption."' 4 Thus, it seems, the more reasoned view allows each parent
his day in court to prove that he has in fact been injured.75
D. The Benefits Rule: A Weighing of Factors
The growing trend in cases involving a healthy but unplanned child
allows rearing expenses as recoverable damages, but permits the defen-
dant to prove that the parents have been benefitted by the birth and sub-
69. See, Note, Mandate and Mishandling, supra note 6, at 138-39 n.83.
70. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, _ 425 N.E.2d 968, 970
(1981) (suggesting that although most parents hold the view that a healthy child is a benefit,
a court should not raise this view to the standard of public policy).
71. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 130-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena, J.,
dissenting).
72. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at , 187 N.W.2d at 517.
73. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TORTs § 43 at 261-62 (4th ed. 1971) (liability
beyond the risk of defendant's actions).
74. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d at 131 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
75. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977).
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sequent rearing of the child as an offset to these damages."' These courts,
in an attempt to apply traditional tort principles, cite what has been
termed the "benefits rule" of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
§ 920: When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plain-
tiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the
interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred
is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.7
The majority of the courts that rely on the benefits rule apply this rule
across the board, the sum of the benefits to be used to offset the sum of
the burdens.78 The benefits rule is, however, by its terms a specific inter-
est rule: the benefit conferred must be used to offset the interest that was
harmed. "Damages resulting from an invasion of one interest are not di-
minished by showing that another interest has been benefited. '79 Two
courts have recognized this limitation but have rejected its application to
cases involving the birth of a healthy but unplanned child.80 The court in
Troppi v. Scarf stated that "[s]ince pregnancy and its attendant anxiety,
incapacity, pain and suffering are inextricably related to child bearing, we
do not think it would be sound to attempt to separate those segments of
damage from the economic costs of an unplanned child in applying the
'same interest' rule."81
The court in Cockrum v. Baumgartner,8 2 however, concerned solely
with the issue of child rearing damages, refused to apply the benefits rule
because of the same-interest limitation: "The rewards of parenthood
should not be allowed in mitigation of rearing costs because 'these re-
wards are emotional in nature and, great though they may be, do nothing
whatever to benefit the plaintiff's injured financial interest.' "83
It appears that the latter holding is the better reasoned view of the
benefits rule as it applies to the birth of a healthy but unwanted child.
Although it is conceded that the pain and suffering, emotional anxiety
76. See, e.g., Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Anonymous v. Hospi-
tal, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Pierce v. DeGracia, 103 IMI. App. 3d 511, 59 M.
Dec. 267, 431 N.E.2d 768 (1982); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157,
404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366
(1981).
77. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. at 253, 445 A.2d at 883; Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d at 169.
79. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 920 comment b (1977).
80. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at -, 187 N.W.2d at 518; Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d at 176.
81. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. at , 187 N.W.2d at 518.
82. 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981).
83. Id. at __, 425 N.E.2d at 970, citing Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing:
Wrongful Life, 31 U. MImi L. RE V. 1409, 1415 (1977).
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and incapacity attributable to the birth of a healthy but unplanned child
are "inextricably related to the child bearing,"" it does not appear that
the economic costs of bearing and rearing a child similarly are related.
Evidence of this would be the holdings of courts which allow general
damages but deny child rearing expenses.15 Further, in general negligence
actions many courts have the jury separate pecuniary losses from emo-
tional anxiety and pain and suffering damages8 6
A strict interpretation of the benefits rule, then, would require the
courts to separate out benefits as they relate to the particular interest
harmed.87 Thus, the emotional joy of raising a child should offset the
emotional anguish of raising a child.8 Similarly, the economic burden of
raising a child should be offset only by any corresponding economic gain
the parents receive from the child. In this light, it should be noted that
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic"9 held that the expenses should be projected
to the age of majority while the benefits conferred should be projected for
the duration of the parent's lives. This is a reflection of the acknowledge-
ment that children may grow up and, past the age of majority, receive
income which benefits the parents.90
There are still courts, however, that deny the use of the benefits rule on
the ground that the weighing of damages and benefits would prove too
speculative in practice.91 The courts that have accepted the benefits rule,
on the other hand, hold that these damage considerations are no more
speculative than considerations in other types of cases, for example,
84. See supra text accompanying note 81.
85. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982). This is not to suggest that
this holding is the correct one. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. This proposition is
advanced merely to show that the economic costs can be disassociated from emotional costs.
86. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
87. See, e.g., Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays, supra note 6; Torts, Wrongful Con-
ception, Measuring Damages Incurred by the Parents of an Unplanned Child: Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1977), 28 DE PAUL L. Rav. 249 (1978).
88. The emotional pain may be greater in the case of a child born with a deformity where
the physician's failure to warn about this possibility is found to be the proximate cause of
the birth. Cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, _, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (1981) (child born with
cystic fibrosis: "Although they [the parents] may derive pleasure from Thomas, that pleas-
ure will be derived in spite of, rather than because of his affliction. [The parents] will re-
ceive no compensating pleasure from incurring extraordinary medical expenses .... There
is no joy in watching a child suffer and die from cystic fibrosis."). See generally, Mason v.
Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981) (suggesting that the emotional
offset would vary with the facts of each case).
89. 260 N.W.2d at 176.
90. Id. See supra note 87; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (providing
that under certain circumstances, a child over 18 years old, whose parents are indigent, must
provide support for those parents).
91. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
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wrongful death, loss of consortium and pain and suffering.2 Further, it
has been argued that a wrongdoer should not be heard to complain that
the damages are not exact, because he alone is responsible for creating
the situation.9 3
In summary, the burdens which can be offset by the corresponding ben-
efits are: (1) economic loss, including the economic costs of pregnancy,
childbirth and child rearing and related costs such as lost wages, medical
expenses, and educational expenses projected through the age of major-
ity;9" and (2) the emotional pain of raising the child projected through the
age of majority. On the other hand, the following "injuries" can not be
offset by any corresponding benefit: (1) pain and suffering of the mother
during pregnancy and childbirth; (2) emotional anguish accompanying
the pregnancy and expected childbirth; and (3) loss of consortium, com-
fort and companionship of wife during pregnancy and childbirth as recov-
erable by the father. As the court in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic9" sug-
gests, special verdicts with explanatory instructions would be helpful
here.
E. Abortion or Adoption! Mitigation of Damages
In many cases involving the birth of a healthy but unplanned child the
question arises as to what extent the parent's failure to abort the fetus90
or place the child for adoption should be considered a failure to mitigate
damages. Some courts which have denied child rearing expenses have
done so by giving this consideration the weight of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption. Thus, where- a parent fails to place the child for adoption, or
fails to abort the fetus, it is irrebuttably presumed that the parent is
92. See Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Anonymous v. Hospital, 38
Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511
(1971).
93. In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931),
the Supreme Court stated:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles
of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be
determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence shows the
extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the re-
sult be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they can
not be measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the case,
which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.
Id.
94. Cf., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d at 176.
95. Id.
96. Abortion may be a legally viable alternative at certain stages of pregnancy. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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benefitted by the physician's negligence more than burdened."
Other courts, in response to this argument, note that a plaintiff, in gen-
eral, "compromises his right to recover damages only by a failure to use
reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of a tort."'98 These
courts rule, as a matter of law, that it would be unreasonable to require
the parent to place the child for adoption, or to abort the fetus solely
because of the risk of losing an award of damages.99 Such a holding is
based partly on the decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut"0 and Roe v.
Wade'01 which preclude the application of these mitigating factors since a
requirement of adoption or abortion would be an unreasonable interfer-
ence with the strictly private choice of family planning.102 Another argu-
ment is based on the strong public policy in favor of keeping the family
together. To force a plaintiff to place the child for adoption would be
unreasonable in light of such a policy. 03 It appears that the best reasoned
argument, based on traditional negligence principles, against considering
these factors as mitigating circumstances, is that the tort-feasor takes the
injured party as he finds him:
If the negligence of a tortfeasor results in conception of a child by a woman
whose emotional and mental makeup is inconsistent with aborting or plac-
ing a child for adoption, then, under the principle that the tortfeasor takes
the injured party as he finds him, the tort-feasor cannot complain that the
damages that will be assessed against him are greater than those that would
be determined if he had negligently caused the conception of a child by a
woman who was willing to abort or place the child for adoption.'"
The courts that deny recovery based upon an irrebuttable presumption
and the courts that give no consideration to these mitigating factors are
97. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (DeL Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980).
98. Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, -, 445 A.2d 883, 886 n.4 (1982). See generally
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, _, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971) where the court said:
"If the effort, risk, sacrifice or expense which the person wronged must incur in order to
avoid or minimize a loss or injury is such that under all the circumstances a reasonable man
might well decline to incur it, a failure to do so imposes no disability against recovering full
damages." (quoting McCoRMicK, DAMAGES § 35, at 133 (1935)).
99. See Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, -, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Cockrum v. Baumgart-
ner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981); (Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Rivera v.
State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa.
Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981).
100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baunmgartner, 99 IlL App. 3d at _, 425 N.E.2d at 970. But see
supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (an argument against such a holding).
103. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Ark. 1982) (Dudley, J., dissenting).
104. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich App. at _ 187 N.W.2d at 520.
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ruling as a matter of law that such actions are always reasonable or un-
reasonable."0 5 As a few courts have noted, however, the findings of reason-
ableness and unreasonableness may change with different factual consid-
erations.1°8 In Ziemba v. Sternberg,10 7 the court rejected the holding that
a failure to abort a child is always a failure to mitigate damages. In this
case the court examined the circumstances surrounding the woman's re-
fusal to abort and held that she had shown it was reasonable to forgo an
abortion.1 0 8 In Stills v. Gratton,10 9 the court ruled that cases involving the
birth of a healthy but unplanned child should be decided on ordinary tort
principles, and, on remand, allowed the defendant to prove any amounts
chargeable to the plaintiff under her duty to mitigate damages.110 In light
of these decisions it is suggested that the reasonableness of the parent's
failure to mitigate damages will vary with the factual circumstances sur-
rounding each case, and therefore, courts should be hesitant to rule, as a
matter of law, that the parent's failure to undergo an abortion or adop-
tion procedure necessarily is reasonable or unreasonable. The trier of fact
should be allowed to decide the issue in light of the particular facts of
each case.'
IV. THE OUTCOME IN VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to consider the issue of dam-
ages in connection with the birth of a healthy but unplanned child. In the
recent decision of Naccash v. Burger,122 however, the court considered the
issue of damages in connection with the birth of a deformed child. In
Naccash, a couple's decision to forgo an abortion was based on a negli-
gently administered test to determine whether or not they were carriers
of Tay Sachs, a fatal disease of the brain and spinal cord which afficts
infants.'13 The court in this case avoided all public policy" 4 issues and
105. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (1980); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
106. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Ziemba v.
Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
107. 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
108. Id. at 269.
109. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976).
110. Id. at 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 658-59.
111. This is not to suggest that the trier of fact must always decide the issue. It may be
the case that the particular facts warrant a conclusion such that "no reasonable person can
differ." If such is the case, then the judge may rule on the facts as he finds them.
112. - Va. -, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
113. Id. at -, 290 S.E.2d at 827.
114. In the case of McNeal v. United States, No. 82-1014, slip op. at 5-6 (4th Cir. Sept.
27, 1982), the court decided that Virginia public policy would not allow the parents "to
retain such benefits as the fun, joy and affection of raising the child, while the defendant is
burdened with all the bills."
It is suggested, however, that dicta in the Naccash case suggests an opposite view: "[W]e
do not necessarily agree that, if liability is established and the damages claimed are compen-
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handled the case under traditional negligence principles. The court noted
that "[o]nly a novel twist in the medical setting differentiates the present
situation from the ordinary malpractice action,"115 and concluded that
the parents were "entitled to recover those damages which are the reason-
able and proximate consequences of the breach of duty owed them, viz.,
consequences that a reasonable and informed person could have forseen
or anticipated."116 The court awarded the parents damages for the care
and treatment of the child with no offset for any benefits the parents
received as a result of the birth,117 but did not deduct from the damages
the reasonable costs of caring for a normal healthy child "18 as other courts
had done.119 The court also awarded damages resulting from the emo-
tional and mental suffering the parents incurred as a result of the birth
and rearing of a child afflicted with Tay Sachs disease in contrast to other
courts which have denied such recovery.1 20
In light of this decision, it seems that the case of Johnson v. Miller,1 21
involving an alleged negligently performed abortion resulting in the birth
of a healthy child, will be decided on appeal under ordinary tort princi-
ples. At trial, the lower court gave a jury instruction which allowed the
jury to consider and award all damages that were pleaded, including the
cost of raising the child to the age of majority.1 22 The court, however,
failed to provide an instruction which would have permitted an offset for
any benefits the parents received as a result of the birth of the child.
Further, the court refused a jury instruction which was concerned with
the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages1 23 (a second abortion or placing
the child up for adoption).
It is suggested that on appeal the court should uphold the lower court's
instruction as to the damages issue-including a consideration of child
sable and just, the court should perform a balancing test between competing economic inter-
ests in determining whether an injured party is entitled to a particular category of dam-
ages." Naccash, - Va. at ., 290 S.E.2d at 830. This dicta plus the avoidance of a public
policy argument and the handling of issues in that case under traditional negligence princi-
ples seems to override the rejection of damages for the reasons suggested in McNeal.
115. Id. at _, 290 S.E.2d at 829.
116. Id. at -, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
117. See also Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
118. See also Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
119. Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (limiting recovery to the
costs of caring for a child born with birth defects offset by the costs of raising a normal
child).
120. Id. at 1026; see also Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1977).
121. No. L-80-2378 (Cir. Ct. of City of Norfolk 1982).
122. Id. (Jury Instruction No. 5).
123. Id. (Jury Instruction No. 9-B (refused)). It appears that this instruction was refused
because the defendant did not bring up the issue until the conclusion of the trial, and to
allow it would work an unfair burden on the plaintiff because he did not address the issue at
trial.
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rearing expenses-because these damages are, in the words of the court in
Naccash, proximately caused by the defendant's negligence and were rea-
sonable, foreseeable consequences of the negligence.12 ' Consistent with
these negligence principles, however, it seems that the court should re-
mand the case for further consideration of the issue of benefits conferred,
as an offset to damages, and the issue of the reasonableness of the plain-
tiff's failure to mitigate these damages by abortion or adoption.
V. CONCLUSION
When a physician's negligence results in the birth of a healthy but un-
planned child the parents should be able to recover those costs which
proximately are caused by this negligence consistent with ordinary tort
principles. Public policy, which is both in favor of awarding damages to
the innocent party in a medical malpractice case 2 and, arguably, against
recovery for the birth and rearing of a healthy child, should not be used
as a rule of law to deny parents the opportunity to recover those damages
when they can show that they were in fact injured both economically and
emotionally by this negligence.
The equitable application of the benefits rule, to offset damages by cor-
responding benefits, will serve to ensure that a physician does not escape
liability for his negligent acts and, on the other hand, ensure that the
parents do not receive windfall benefits because of this negligence. It may
be that in most cases the jury will award only minimal damages for the
birth of a healthy child, but the parents, if injured, should not be pre-
cluded from pleading that the negligence caused them injuries for which
they are not being justly compensated.
Kenneth F. Hardt
124. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15. It is important to note here that in a
recent Pennsylvania decision, Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d
1366 (1981), the court when faced with a case involving the birth of a healthy child after an
alleged negligently performed sterilization operation, felt itself bound by the decision of
Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979) (reversed as to the decision
denying emotional damages in 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981)), dealing with the birth of a de-
formed child. The court in Mason concluded:
[I]t would be inconsistent to hold that parents of a deformed or diseased child may
recover all expenses arising from the tortious conduct while not permitting any recov-
ery for parents of a normal child given that the child in both cases is unwanted ....
[I]t is axiomatic that the tort-feasor is liable for all damages which ordinarily and in
the natural course of things have resulted from the commission of the tort.
Mason, 286 Pa. Super. at -, 428 A.2d at 1370.
125. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (suggesting that
these damage awards would serve as a useful deterrent to negligent performance of steriliza-
tion operations).
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